Project Safe Neighborhoods was the centerpiece of the Bush administration's crime policy in President Bush's first term. This is a policy driven by deterrence and incapacitation and directed at reducing gun violence. In brief, the policy called for federal prosecution of certain gun crimes that had been previously prosecuted at the local level. The get-tough-on-crime message was further enhanced by minimum mandatory sentences. The interesting break from earlier efforts at deterrence and incapacitation was that Project Safe Neighborhoods provided funds to develop and execute a well-designed public service campaign to "get the message out there." Interrupted time-series analysis of project effects in the Southern District of Alabama points to significantly lower postintervention gun crime.
and thus incapable of fulfilling the promise of the positivists. The very institutional arrangements of the public bureaucracy are flawed and unable to deliver the services that they are designed to provide. Others insist that even if public bureaucracies did function as promised, the institutions of government preclude the distribution of public resources to those who need them most, in this case those from lower socioeconomic groups who are most disposed to crime (Stein & Bickers, 1995) . More important, conservatives maintain that criminal behavior is not determined but rather is the product of the rational calculations of those who offend. Although conservative thinkers do not exclude public policy as an instrument to address crime, they do believe that it should be limited and directed toward influencing the offender decision calculus.
Economists (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Kaplow & Shavell, 1999; Polinsky & Shavell, 1984; Posner, 1977; Stigler, 1970) have applied the theory of rational choice to the criminal decision calculus and as such have been instrumental in the reemergence of the classical school (the neoclassical school). A number of criminologists have adopted the fundamental assumptions and theoretical underpinnings of rational choice as it applies to crime policy (Clarke & Felson, 1993) . Although the array of criminological approaches that fall within the general rational choice model is broad, the fundamental assumptions are not: Humans possess free will and are capable of making choices; humans are rational, and given a choice between alternatives, they will choose the one that is most likely to satisfy their self-interest, however defined; and humans will seek pleasure and avoid pain. Public policies implied by the neoclassical school are likely to be limited to and directed toward influencing the rational calculations of those predisposed to criminal behavior. Increase the costs of offending, and society thus reduces the likelihood of the offender's choosing the offense option (i.e., general and specific deterrence).
Not only has rational choice theory opened the academic door for a wide range of interesting conceptual and empirical activity; it has also provided a compelling legitimacy around which conservatives can form crime policies more in keeping with their fundamental political and social philosophy. Whether one agrees with that philosophy or not, one would be hard-pressed to deny that the academy has facilitated the design of various crime policies that differ in meaningful ways from those grounded in the positivist school.
Increasing the Costs of Gun Crime: Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) Background
In February 1997, the U.S. Attorney's Office in Richmond, Virginia, announced Project Exile, a policy that conformed closely to the neoclassical school. Quite simply, the program provided for aggressive enforcement of existing federal statutes. These statutes called for federal prosecution and minimum mandatory sentencing for any felon found possessing a firearm. Although state statutes may have existed that punished individuals for firearm possession, the federal statutes were harsher, and because of the federal mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines, there was no judicial discretion that would permit a community correctional disposition. The implementation of the policy coincided with a dramatic decline in homicides in Richmond; Project Exile was credited with that decline. The policy was adopted in several other jurisdictions across the nation, in each case its designers hoping to duplicate the outcome in Richmond. A later assessment by Ludwig and Cook (2003) concluded that decreases in violent crimes in Richmond were not likely to be attributable to Project Exile.
In 1999, George W. Bush, then governor of Texas and deeply involved in his race for the presidency, announced a $1.6 million grant to start a state-level "Project Exile" in Texas. The grant earmarked funds to both increase federal prosecutions and design and implement a systematic public awareness campaign. The Bush policy in Texas was in stark contrast to the prevailing "liberal" position on gun violence, namely, regulating gun ownership. Regulation, by the way, was the position of Vice President Al Gore, Bush's opponent in the 2000 presidential election. Bush argued, in keeping with the National Rifle Association's position, that violent crime was best addressed by aggressively enforcing existing laws, not by controlling gun ownership.
In May 2001, President George W. Bush announced his administration's crime control centerpiece, PSN. PSN was patterned after the original Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia, and thus Bush's gun violence policy during his tenure as governor. There were four essential components of PSN:
1. Federal prosecutions for gun possession by individuals falling under existing federal legislation (i.e., those possessing drugs at the time of arrest, convicted felons, fugitives from another state, anyone under felony indictment, a person subject to a restraining order, a drug user, or a person involved in prior domestic abuse or possessing a gun known to be stolen). Sentencing for someone convicted under this federal statute carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years in federal prison, or if the convicted party had been convicted of three prior violent crimes, a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years in federal prison. 2. An integrated and coordinated partnership between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. 3. Outreach efforts to involve the community in PSN. Sites that adopted PSN were expected to form task forces that included relevant community stakeholders. Task forces were encouraged to design innovative approaches to reducing gun violence. 4. Each site that participated in PSN was expected to hire an administrator to oversee a $150,000 award to produce a multifaceted public awareness campaign. The campaign was intended to diffuse the message to the relevant demographic group that the cost of possessing a firearm had increased.
Overall, PSN projects would be administered by the local U.S. Attorney's Office. All 94 U.S. attorneys were encouraged to participate in PSN. For those who did, the U.S. Department of Justice awarded a $300,000 grant to fund the public service campaign and a research partner who would provide assessment assistance to the task force. The initial grant was intended to fund operations for 3 years and was rolled out in late 2002. Michigan State University was awarded a grant to oversee the training of research partners and be the national repository of gun violence data collected by the research partners.
PSN: The Southern District of Alabama
As noted above, the apparent success of Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia, prompted other law enforcement agencies to adopt similar programs, two of which were in Alabama. In 1999, the Birmingham, Alabama, Police Department launched Operation Ice (isolating the criminal element). In April 2002, the Mobile, Alabama, Police Department followed suit. The chief of the Mobile Police Department approved a $50,000 allocation of drug asset forfeiture funds to support Mobile's Operation Ice. Nearly all the funds were used for a public relations campaign, designed and implemented by a local public relations firm. The campaign was intended to inform the public, especially the targeted demographic group (young males), of the costs associated with possessing a firearm. Billboards and radio and television public service announcements (PSAs) were run from summer 2002 through early 2003, approximately 6 months. Operation Ice, like Project Exile, included a commitment by the local U.S. Attorney to aggressively prosecute gun crimes falling within the guidelines of the federal gun statutes.
It should be noted that Operation Ice did not include dramatic changes in the Mobile Police Department's field operations. The department believed that existing field operations were effective. Arrests for gun crimes, although there was always room for improvement, were not the problem. The problem, as the department saw it, was the reluctance of federal prosecutors and judges to aggressively enforce existing gun possession laws, laws that were harsher than state statutes. department executives believed that getting the message out, getting federal prosecutors to charge local felons caught possessing firearms, and getting federal judges to follow the minimum mandatory sentencing policy should produce the desired effect (i.e., reduction of gun crimes).
In August 2002, the three U.S. Attorneys of the state of Alabama, at their annual law enforcement conference, announced Alabama Ice. Alabama Ice was the precursor to PSN. U.S. Attorneys in the Northern, Middle, and Southern Districts of Alabama each submitted proposals and were awarded funding for PSN in their district. In Alabama the project was thus known as both Alabama Ice and PSN.
The University of South Alabama was named the research partner for the Southern District of Alabama; the United Way was awarded a grant to fund and oversee the public awareness aspect of PSN. The United Way contracted with a local public relations firm to develop the PSN media campaign. Although this public relations firm was different from the one used by the Mobile Police Department, the essentials of the campaign and the population targeted were nearly identical. Beginning in spring 2003, about the same time that the Mobile Police Department's ads ceased, and continuing for approximately 1 year, a multifaceted media campaign was executed, targeted to a young adult demographic group. The media campaign consisted of billboards and television and radio PSAs, as had the Mobile Police Department's approach. The PSN-funded PSAs were created by a national public relations firm. Those PSAs were used by all participating U.S. Attorney's Offices. Some slight modifications were incorporated to describe the local jurisdiction. The local PSN public relations firm, chosen by United Way, arranged through a somewhat complicated scheduling formula for placement of the PSN spots in various television and radio media.
Early in the project, the research partner, in discussions with the U.S. Attorney's Office, chose to focus the assessment on the city of Mobile. There were two reasons for selecting Mobile as the target site: First, the Mobile Police Department was the only law enforcement agency in the Southern District of Alabama with a reasonably well-designed automated information system. In addition, the database contained fields that permitted queries of crimes committed with firearms. This was obviously a critical data requirement for assessment purposes. The database contained crime report data (also calls for service and offender data) dating back to January 1, 1998. This provided nearly 5 years of monthly gun crime data prior to the start of PSN. Second, the Mobile Police Department had a departmental policy in effect that conformed to the operations of PSN. The department had an Operation Ice coordinator in place and had trained a sworn member to act as a liaison with Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and with the U.S. Attorney's Office.
In addition to encouraging local-federal law enforcement coordination, PSN also called for the creation of district task forces. The goal was to bring together various regional stakeholders in a setting that would encourage a variety of tactical initiatives to reduce gun violence. Although a task force was loosely formed in the southern district, it did not produce any tactical initiatives within the city of Mobile. Thus, the combination of no new police department tactical field operations related to Operation Ice or PSN on one hand and the absence of any task force-related operational changes on the other limited the intervention in the Southern District of Alabama to the PSAs.
Surveys Data, Variables, and Findings
For deterrence to work, the offender must be rational, must have information about the costs of offending, and must believe that the costs outweigh the benefits of offending. We assumed the rational offender; we needed to know whether the "cost" message was being transmitted to the target population and whether the target believed that the costs had been increased. We sought to answer this question by conducting several surveys: (a) two citizen surveys (summer 2003 and summer 2004) 1 and (b) three jail inmate surveys (summer 2003, summer 2004, and summer 2006) .
2 Table 1 depicts the findings of the citizen surveys. These surveys revealed the following: (a) Diffusion of the message to the general public expanded from 2003 to 2004, up 15% (from 13% to 28%), and (b) most of those who were familiar with PSN or Operation Ice knew that it was about gun violence. Table 2 depicts the findings of the inmate surveys. These results reveal the following: (a) A far greater percentage of inmates, compared with the general public, were aware of PSN or Operation Ice; (b) about the same percentage of citizens and inmates who were aware of the policy were likewise aware of its being directed at gun violence; (c) most got their PSN or Operation Ice information from television; and (d) in all three surveys, high percentages of both those aware of PSN or Operation Ice and those unaware of PSN or Operation Ice believed that one who possessed a gun was more likely to be sentenced to prison; however, a greater percentage of those who were aware of the policy believed this to be so.
The citizen surveys and inmate surveys lead to several conclusions: (a) The target population would appear to be receiving the message, and (b) those who are predisposed to offend (i.e., inmates) and receive the message are more likely to believe that the cost of possessing a firearm on arrest is a prison sentence. Yet to be determined was whether the perception of increased costs for possessing firearms translated into a reduction of gun violence.
Gun Violence in Mobile, Alabama Data
The Mobile Police Department's digital database (COMPASS) contains all reported crime data. When the database was created, the designers designated multiple fields to isolate a variety of crime incidents in which a gun was used. For purposes of this project, data regarding the following types of gun incidents were downloaded: assaults with a gun, discharging a firearm, ex-felon in possession of a firearm, homicide with a gun, menacing with a gun, no pistol permit, rape and sodomy with a gun, robbery with a gun, and shooting into a house or vehicle. In addition to gun crimes, we collected data regarding the following property crimes: commercial and residential burglary, burglary from a vehicle, arson, and vehicle theft. The range of these data was from January 1, 1998, through August 1, 2006.
We also collected PSN-related cases prosecuted and case disposition data from the U.S. Attorney's Office. The range of these data was from April 2001 through August 2006. Finally, we collected gunshot trauma admissions data from the University of South Alabama Hospitals, the regional trauma unit. The range of these data was from January 2000 through August 2006.
Dependent Variables
Unfortunately, the implementation of PSN prevented evaluation utilizing an experimental design. All 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices participated in PSN to one degree or another. The PSAs were dispersed throughout the country. Task forces were formed, to varying degrees, in many of the sites. Police PSN-related operations varied across the country. Research partners were thus unable to randomly assign treatments and furthermore were left with wide variance of treatments across sites. As such, a quasiexperimental design, interrupted time-series, autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) was chosen to analyze the impact of PSN on gun violence in Mobile. Eight models were constructed to investigate the effect of the PSN intervention on several aspects of gun violence. The dependent variables were as follows: (a) total gun crimes (assault with a gun, discharging a firearm, ex-felon in possession of a firearm, homicide with a gun, menacing with a gun, no pistol permit, sex crimes [rape and sodomy] with a gun, robbery with a gun, and shooting into a car or residence), (b) total violent crime with a gun (assault with a gun, homicide with a gun, sex crimes [rape and sodomy] with a gun, and robbery with a gun), (c) total homicides with a gun, (d) total sex crimes with a gun (rape and sodomy), (e) total robberies with a gun, (f) total assault with a gun, (g) total menacing with a gun, and (h) total gunshot trauma admissions. 
Independent Variables
The hypotheses constructed were straightforward. The PSN-funded PSAs should result in a decrease in gun-related crime and gunshot trauma admissions. Thus, we modeled the impact of the intervention (the PSAs) on the variance in the eight dependent variables. To control for overall rises or declines in crime pre-and postintervention, a property crime variable (see above) was created. The intervention (PSAs) was operationalized as a dummy variable. The start date for the intervention was set at August 2002. This was approximately 4 months after the announcement by the Mobile Police Department of Operation Ice. For gun crime models, this start date provided us with 55 months of preintervention data and 45 months of postintervention data. For the gunshot trauma model, we had 31 months of preintervention data and 45 months of postintervention data.
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Descriptive Statistics
Figures 1-9 provide graphic illustration of the monthly change over time in the variables of interest. The vertical broken line represents the intervention (i.e., Operation Ice/PSN). With the exception of homicide with a gun, sex crimes with a gun, and property crimes, it is readily apparent that the series after the intervention depicts a declining frequency of the event being tracked. Table 3 summarizes the pre-and postintervention means for the seven gun crime categories, gunshot trauma unit admissions, and property crimes. The pre-and postintervention means for all the gun crime categories, except for sex crimes with a gun, decreased when comparing the two periods, thus confirming what appeared to be the case from the time-series line graphs. The property crime mean increased in the period after the Operation Ice-PSN program was initiated, providing preliminary support for the idea that the decrease in gun crime was not a reflection of overall declines in crime.
Police Quarterly
Findings: ARIMA Analysis ARIMA models were calculated independently for each of the dependent variables according to the previously described analytic strategy. We applied an intervention component that assumed a 4-month delay (following the April 2002 rollout of Operation Ice) in the effects of the PSAs. Thus, our intervention was set at August 2002. This assumes an immediate deterrent effect of the PSAs after the intervention date. Table 4 summarizes the results of the ARIMA analysis of the eight models. Note in Table 4 that three of the eight models had ARIMA parameters of (0,0,0). The dependent variables, in these models, were not autocorrelated. The method of analysis in these models, thus, was ordinary least squares linear regression. In those models, the F statistic and R-square are reported.
The intervention, after controlling for property crime, had a significant effect in four crime categories (total gun crime, all violent crime with a gun, robberies with a gun, and all assaults with a gun) and in gunshot trauma admissions. There was no significant effect of the intervention on homicides and sex crimes. On average, and after property crime was controlled for, total gun crime (all categories in the Mobile Police Department database in which a gun was used in commission of the offense and those instances in which a gun was in the possession of an offender) decreased after the introduction of PSAs by about 26 incidents per month, violent crime with a gun (murder with a gun, rape with a gun, robbery with a gun, and aggravated assault with a gun) decreased after the introduction of PSAs by about 16 incidents per month, and robbery with a gun decreased after the intervention by about 11 incidents per month. Gunshot trauma admissions data represent the number of patients admitted to the local trauma center (University of South Alabama Hospital) for gunshot wounds. Gunshot wound admissions after the intervention decreased on average by about 2 incidents per month, after property crimes were controlled for.
Discussion and Policy Implications
On May 13, 2003, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee held public hearings to provide interested parties a forum to address Congress regarding the Bush administration's
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Property Crimes PSN. Professor Jens Ludwig testified at those hearings. As noted above, Ludwig coauthored an article with Raphael (Raphael & Ludwig, 2003) in which, after analyzing the data, they found that decreases in homicides in Richmond, Virginia, from 1997 to 1998 were not attributable to Operation Exile (the policy after which PSN was modeled) nor thus to sentencing enhancements. In testimony before the Committee, Ludwig maintained that he believed, based on the Exile findings, that the sentencing enhancement element of PSN was not likely to be cost-effective. He argued that the policing elements of PSN (arrest and seizure of weapons) would likely have a greater impact on gun violence. Ludwig pointed to empirical evidence (e.g., Cohen & Ludwig, 2003) that confirmed the effectiveness of policing operations targeted at illegal gun possession.
It is important to note that Ludwig's testimony substantially minimized the most powerful deterrent element of PSN (i.e., sentence enhancements). Ludwig offered substantial empirical evidence to support his skepticism of sentence enhancements (Kessler & Levitt, 1999; Levitt, 1996; Marvell & Moody, 1995; McDowall, Loftin, & Wiersema, 1992) . Ludwig conceded the obvious effect of incapacitation (i.e., marginal reductions in crime attributable to the inability of the imprisoned individual to offend); however, he was clearly skeptical of the general deterrent effect of sentence enhancements alone. The swiftness and certainty of punishment, according to Ludwig, can be best transmitted to offenders through aggressive police activity (i.e., arrests). Ultimately, it appears that Ludwig was not arguing against sentencing enhancements; rather, he seemed to suggest that the missing necessary, albeit probably not sufficient, condition to reduce gun violence was the criminal justice system's ability to convey the cost message to those predisposed to gun violence (i.e., felons in possession of firearms).
It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue with Ludwig's position that the rational offender is not likely to cease offending unless and until convinced that the costs of gun possession have been substantially increased. The issue, then, centers on the delivery of the cost message. Ludwig assumed that the message element of PSN was limited to policing aspects. Ludwig ignored the public service campaign element of PSN and its importance to the policy's message delivery component. The PSAs were an important aspect of PSN, one that PSN planners highlighted.
At the 2004 PSN National Conference, James B. Comey, deputy U.S. attorney general, addressed the attendees. Mr. Comey's take on PSN was particularly interesting. He maintained that PSN dramatically departed from earlier deterrence efforts. Mr. Comey pointed out that PSN was a national program in which the services of professional public relations firms were being utilized to "get the PSN message out." It was this public-private partnership element, according to Mr. Comey, that set PSN apart from earlier deterrent efforts.
Assume for the sake of argument that the rational choice theory is correct. For the theory to translate into practical crime reduction public policy, several conditions must be satisfied. First, we must have a policy (e.g., PSN sentence enhancements) that increases the cost of engaging in some behavior that we wish to change (e.g., the possession of firearms by individuals likely to use them for illegal purposes). Second, we must convey to the target population the message that there has been a change in the cost of engaging in the behavior. And third, we must convince the target population that the cost is real, not merely political posturing. Ludwig argued that aggressive policing operations would satisfy these conditions. Although, as pointed out above, the first condition has been satisfied in many instances, the second and third conditions have been met somewhat less.
For PSN, sentencing enhancement federal legislation satisfied the first condition. Mr. Comey's point about the public-private partnership (i.e., public relations firms) described how PSN was a systematic effort to satisfy the second and third conditions. The television and radio PSAs were produced by professionals whose career depended on constructing a compelling message and getting that message to the targeted population. If the advertising professionals can persuade teenagers to buy a pair of grossly overpriced gym shoes they can ill afford, why then cannot these same people convince the desired targeted population that carrying a firearm dramatically increases the likelihood that prison will follow and that the prison experience will be very unpleasant. If Joe Camel can persuade children to engage in a physically distasteful (literally and figuratively) behavior, then why can't Johnnie Cochran (a spokesperson in one the PSN television ads) convince potential offenders not to carry a gun? Although he did not state this explicitly, Mr. Comey certainly implied it.
The Southern District of Alabama was particularly well situated to test Mr. Comey's argument. Although a task force was loosely organized in the southern district, per the recommendations of PSN, it did not design or implement any initiatives in the city of Mobile. The Mobile Police Department also did not substantially change any of its normal tactical operations, other than to develop a liaison with the U.S. attorney's office to smoothly facilitate the processing of PSN gun cases. The police department firmly believed that getting the message out and following through on prosecutions held out the greatest hope of reducing gun violence. Its use of drug asset forfeiture funds to purchase PSAs prior to the start of PSN demonstrates its conviction. From a research perspective, then, we were not troubled by extraneous "noise" that an active task force or a series of modified police tactical operations might have created. The intervention in Mobile was reduced to a single independent variable; although that independent variable could not be manipulated through an experimental design that would have permitted random assignment, the intervention could be isolated to the PSAs alone, which, according to Mr. Comey, was a critical element of the PSN policy.
The findings reported here give some reasonable degree of confidence that the PSAs had the intended effect in Mobile. Sentencing enhancements, conveyed to the target population through a variety of PSAs, reduced gun violence and gunshot trauma injury in Mobile. There are, however, some cautions. Although interrupted time-series analysis is considered a strong quasiexperimental research design, it is
